PREVENTING THE OPERATION OF UNTAXED BUSINESS
BY TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
Many organizations exempt from federal income tax1 raise money
by engaging in business. The belief that such businesses, if not taxed,
would unfairly compete with taxed concerns caused Congress in 1950 to
place a tax on the "unrelated" business income2 of certain exempt organizations.3 Before 1950 some courts had sought to resolve the same problem
by removing exemption from the entire organization. At the Revenue

I INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c), provides tax exemption for seventeen types of
organizations. Best known are: religious, scientific, and educational organizations,
§ 501(c)(3); social welfare organizations, § 501(c)(4); business leagues, real estate boards,
and chambers of commerce, § 501(c)(6); and social clubs, § 501(c)(7). Exemption is
also provided for certain employee pension trusts, § 501(a).
2 INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 511-14. For a general description of the provisions see
Comment, Colleges, Charitiesand the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 YALE L.J. 851 (1951). The
unrelated business income tax provisions divide the exempt and business functions of
certain organizations as did nineteenth century courts applying state property taxes.
See, e.g., Methodist Episcopal Church v. Chicago, 26 I1. 482 (1861); Proprietors of
South Congregational Meeting House v. Lowell, 42 Mass. (I Met.) 588 (1840) (Shaw, J.).
In the first taxable year to which §§ 511-14 applied, $37.00 of unrelated business income
tax was collected. The amount has never exceeded $2,000,000. Letter from Mitchell
Rogovin, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, to the University of Chicago Law
Review, Feb. 25, 1965, on file at the University of Chicago Law Review. The provisions
do not apply to all tax-exempt organizations, but only to organizations exempt by
§§ 401, 501(c)(2), 501(c)(3), 501(c)(5), 501(c)(6), and 501(c)(17). In addition to the unielated business income tax, a tax was placed on "feeder" corporations which operated
businesses and turned over all their income to exempt organizations. INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 502.
3 Other limitations were placed on these organizations at the same time. To prevent
accumulation of funds to finance or control the business operations of donors or
founders of exempt trusts and foundations a provision was added to the Code which
removes exemption for "unreasonably" accumulating income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 504(a)(1). See Riecker, Foundations and the Patman Committee Report, 63 MicH. L.
Rv. 95, 125-31 (1964). Provisions were also added prohibiting certain loans or payments
to contributors and founders of the organization, and to corporations controlled by
such persons. INT. Rlv. CODE OF 1954, § 503(c); see Comment, Colleges, Charities and
the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 YALE L.J. 851, 868 n.76 (1951). Violation of the provisions
requires removal of exemption. These provisions have been criticized as not preventing
many abuses. Id. at 868, 877; Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and
Means on Revenue Revision of 1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 780 (1950). To inhibit
shrinkage of the tax base through purchase of income-producing real property by
exempt organizations, a tax was placed on rent from certain property acquired with
borrowed funds. INT. Rv. CODE of 1954, § 514. See Cary, Corporate Financing Through
the Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62
Hazv. L. Rav. 1 (1948); Comment, Taxation of Sale and Lease-Back Transactions, 60
YALE L.J. 879 (1951).
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Service's urging many have continued to use this all-or-nothing approach
which denies to the socially valuable activities of the organization the
benefits of tax-free investment income and of gifts which are deductible
by their donors. 5 This comment argues that the Congressional solution
should not continue to be ignored.
I.
The two statutory provisions most often relied on by courts dealing
with exempt organizations require that (1) an organization be operated
"exclusively" for purposes which justify exemption, and (2) none of the
organization's income "inure . . . to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." 6 Violation of either condition has caused removal
of exemption. However, many of the cases both before and after 1950
which rely on these requirements can be consistently explained only as
removing exemption' to eliminate the evil aimed at by the unrelated
business income tax provisions-the operation of competitive business.
A. The Operated "Exclusively" Requirement
The operated "exclusively" requirement has been the Commissioner's
main weapon against religious, charitable, educational and social welfare
organizations. 7 Both it and the "no-benefit" clause were added to the
Corporate Excise Tax of 19098 in an attempt to state that an exempt
4 No case has been found in which the Commissioner urged use of the unrelated
business income tax as a substitute for removal of exemption. See cases cited note 16
infra.
5 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(c), allowing deductions for gifts to certain
organizations which meet requirements for exemption under § 501(c).
6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c). The first requirement applies to organizations
exempt under § 501(c)(3) (religious, charitable, scientific and educational organizations), (c)(4) (civic leagues, social welfare organizations), (c)(7) (social dubs), (c)(13)
(certain cemetery companies). The second requirement applies to organizations exempt
under § 501(c)(3), (c)(6) (business leagues, real estate boards, chambers of commerce),
(c)(7), (c)(9) (employee beneficiary associations), (c)(10) (employee beneficiary associations), (c)(11) (teachers' retirement funds), (c)(13). Many of the organizations which
must be "operated exclusively" for exempt purposes must also be "organized
exclusively" for exempt purposes. But "the word 'organized' cannot be divorced from
'operated' for the true character of an organization must be drawn from the manner
in which it has been operated." 6 MmTs, INcOME TAXATION § 34.07 (Zimet rev. 1957,
Supp. 1964) (citing authority). See Commissioner v. John Danz Charitable Trust, 284
F.2d 726, 734 (9th Cir. 1960) (broad powers of trustee consistent with "organized" for
exempt purpose).
7 Common problems arise in applying the provisions, and cases involving different
organizations freely cross-cite each other. See People's Educ. Camp Soc'y, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 331 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1964), affirming 39 T.C. 756 (1963), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 839 (1964); Evanston-North Shore Bd. of Realtors v. United States, 320 F2d
375 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
8 Tariff of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112.
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organization could operate a business without losing its exemption if
its business income was used exclusively for exempt purposes.9 Thus
the historically correct view before 1950 was that business profits could
not be taxed if used to finance exempt activity.' 0 That is the rule which
Congress overruled by passing the unrelated business income tax
provisions."
But instead of reading the operated "exclusively" clause as limiting
the purposes for which business income may be used, courts before and
after 1950 have read it as limiting the amount of business activity permissible. "Exclusively" has been read "primarily" which in turn
has been given two meanings, both of which rest on competition with
taxed businesses.
The first requires that business operations be not "disproportionate" to
exempt activity. The Treasury Regulations adopt this reading, requiring
analysis of the "size and extent of the trade or business and the size and
extent of activities which are in furtherance of exempt purposes."1 2 In
Aviation Club v. Commissioner's the Tenth Circuit accepted this view,
removing exemption from a social dub when its wartime sale of liquor
and food to the general public exceeded prewar sales to its members by
about twenty times. The selling was found to be "wholly disproportionate"'14 to the exempt activity. But untaxed sale of liquor and food was
allowed an identical organization by the Tax Court in Aviation Country
9 The present exemption statute originated in the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909
which imposed a tax on "every corporation, joint stock company or association,
organized for profit and having a capital stock represented by shares .. ." Tariff 1909,
ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112. Although the bill's language implicitly excluded non-profit
and non-stock companies from taxation, Senator Bacon of Georgia feared that the
language did not make dear that a charitable corporation could engage in a profitmaking business and remain exempt. 44 CONG. Rxc. 4151 (1909). Consequently he
introduced the operated "exclusively" and "no-benefit" clauses to the definition of taxexempt organizations to emphasize that as long as the business income was used to
support a charitable activity exemption would not be lost. The Senator was concerned
that a church-operated publishing house not lose its exemption. Ibid. The organization
had previously had its exemption from state property taxes challenged and sustained.
See Book Agents of Methodist Episcopal Church v. Hinton, 92 Tenn. 188, 21 S.W. 321
(1893).
10 The leading case is Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir.
1938). See 6 ME.RTENS, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 34.07 nn.79-83.
11 See People's Educ. Camp Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 932, 935 (2d Cir.
1964), affirming 39 T.C. 756 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 839 (1964).
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) (1959), as amended T.D. 6525, 1961-1 Cums. Buu.
186. One Revenue Service official has noted that these are "vague criteria" and that
such "physical comparisons are not very meaningful." Statement by Mitchell Rogovin,
then Assistant to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, at 17th Annual Federal Tax
Conference, The University of Chicago Law School, October 29, 1964.
13 162 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1947).
14

Id. at 986.
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Club, Inc.,' 5 when the business remained at the size necessary to serve
members only. Each club provided similar services to its members, but
because the first ran a larger competitive business it lost its exemption.
The second and more frequent judicial reading allows operation of
"incidental" but not "substantial" businesses. 16 Scripture Press Foundation v. United States17 illustrates the difficulty of using this test and
suggests that prevention of competitive business activity best explains removal of exemption. To improve the quality of Sunday school teaching
materials the foundation published and sold religious literature, trained
teachers and engaged in door-to-door evangelism. The question for
decision was described in language typical of the operated "exclusively"
cases:

was the sale of religious literature by the plaintiff in this case
incidental to the plaintiff's religious purposes? Or were plaintiff's religious objectives incidental to the sale of religious

literature? 18
In denying exemption the Court of Claims emphasized the disparity
between expenditures for religious-educational programs and the accumulated capital surplus from the publishing activity. Without explaining,
it rejected the contention that the publishing business was exempt educational activity.' 9 The court's emphasis on the competitive character
of the activity may explain the otherwise unarticulated justification for
removal of exemption.
[T]he sale of these materials, however religiously inspired, involved the plaintiff directly in the conduct of a trade or business
for profit ....
It should be remembered that there are many commercial
concerns which sell Bibles, scrolls, and other religious and semi15 21 T.C. 807 (1954).
16 See Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945)

(construing

§ 811(b)(8) of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, 639 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 1011(b) (1947),
drawn almost verbatim from the predecessor of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3));
Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1950); American
Institute for Economic Research v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 548, 554, 302 F.2d 934,
938 (1962); Golden Rule Church Ass'n, 41 T.C. 719, 728 n.8 (1964); People's Educ.
Camp Soc'y, Inc., 39 T.C. 756, 772 (1963), aff'd, 331 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1964); Donald G.
Griswold, 39 T.C. 620, 634 n.7 (1962); Stevens Bros. Foundation, Inc., 39 T.C. 93, 109
n.10 (1962); Best Lock Corp., 31 T.C. 1217, 1236 (1959) (15% is "substantial'); Estate
of Thayer, 24 T.C. 384, 392 (1955) (2% insubstantial); Sugarman & Pomeroy, Business
Income of Exempt Organizations,46 VA. L. REv. 424, 425 (1960).
17 152 Ct. Cl. 463, 285 F.2d 800 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962).
18 Id. at 469, 285 F.2d at 804.
19 Id. at 472-73, 285 F.2d at 806.
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religious literature which have not been granted exemption
20
as to that part of their business.
A number of other cases suggest the same underlying rationale. In
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden,21 the Supreme Court held the sale of wine
and candy by a religious order to be "incidental," emphasizing that the
small sales "do not amount to engaging in trade .... It is not claimed
that there is any selling to the public or in competition with others." 22
Other cases have held, without discussion, that organizations were
operated "exclusively" for exempt purposes when they received income
from the occasional sale23 or lease 24 of land or from the sale of interests in
publishing rights 25-activities which were not regarded as engaging in
business.26 Yet exemption has been removed when organizations received
half the profits of a construction job,27 or engaged in very active stock
trading.28
The recent case of People's Educ. Camp Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner2
20 Id. at 472 & n.11, 285 F.2d at 806 & n.11. Scripture Press Foundationcited, but di
not distinguish, Saint Germain Foundation, 26 T.C. 648 (1956), which sustained the
exemption of a, church which sold literature describing its beliefs. The case may be
distinguished by the fact that no other enterprise provided literature on the faith, and
consequently the church was not in competition with commercial publishers. Golden
Rule Church Ass'n, 41 T.C. 719 (1964), allowing businesses to be operated by a church
association, may also be distinguished on the grounds that the business had no
competitive advantage. In Golden Rule the businesses were operated at a loss by
"student ministers" as a part of their religious way of life and avoided undercutting
similar commercial enterprises. 41 T.C. at 725, 729. The court apparently sustained
exemption on the first amendment, stating that "we have grave doubts that a contrary
conclusion would be permitted under the Constitution of the United States." Id. at
729.
21 263 U.S. 578 (1923).
22

Id. at 582.

Jack Little Foundation v. Jones, 102 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Okla. 1951); Town and
Country Club, I CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 334 (1942).
24 Akron Clinic Foundation v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
25 Bob and Dolores Hope Foundation, 61 U.S. Tax Cas. 80236 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
26 See SuRREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 689-90 (1962); SuRREY &
WVARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (Supp. 1964, at 123); cf. Commissioner v. Ferrer,
304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
27 Stevens Bros. Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1963),
reversing in part 39 T.C. 93 (1963).
28 Randall Foundation v. Riddell, 244 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1957). Although active
trading of securities on a stock exchange is treated as producing capital gains rather
than ordinary income, it has been suggested that the activity can be regarded as
being so active as to qualify as the business of trading. See SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL
23

INCOME TAXATION

698-99 (1962). The court in Randall Foundation regarded the

foundation's stock trading activities as engaging in business on the ground that: "it is
conceivable that a business corporation might well have been organized to do exactly
what Foundation did." 244 F.2d at 807.
29 331 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1964), affirming 39 T.C. 756 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S.

839 (1964).
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explicitly rested removal of exemption on the prevention of competitive
advantage. The Camp Society supported one of the largest libraries on
the labor movement, Socialism and Communism by operating a luxury
resort in the Pocono Mountains. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit emphasized the competitive character of the resort.
[P]etitioner's Poconos resort operation is anything but small, and
it competes actively for the public's business with other commercial resorts in the Poconos area. More importantly, unlike the
corporation in the Sagrada Orden case, petitioner has, over the
years, applied substantial portions of its income to expanding
its business operations . .

.0

These cases, in reading operated "exclusively" to require removal of
exemption if the business is more than "incidental," are inconsistent
with the unrelated business income tax provisions, which dearly envisage the operation of a business. The inconsistency cannot be resolved
by construing the provisions as applicable only to "insubstantial" or
"incidental" income. The Code expressly excluded $1,000 from unrelated business taxable income,3 ' a Committee Report explains, because
such "incidental" amounts are too inconvenient to collect.3 2 The courts'

view means that every exempt organization which engages in activity
that could be considered a business operates at the risk of losing its
exemption. Even a sincere belief that the sale of religious books was a
religious activity did not prevent the Scripture Press Foundation, for
example, from losing the benefits of exemption for all its activities.
B. The "No-Benefit" Requirement
The "no-benefit"33 requirement, with the operated "exclusively"
clause, was inserted in the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 as part of the at30 Id. at 934. The court refused to apply the destination of income test to the
organization's business income, in view of the policy of the unrelated business income
tax provisions-prevention of unfair competition. Id. at 935. It could not, however,

prevent the competition by applying the provisions directly because they are inapplicable to social welfare organizations of the type involved in the case. See note 2

supra.
31 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b)(12).
32 H.R. RtP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1950), 1950-2 CuM. BuLL. 380, 409.
33 The requirement that an organization not be "organized for profit" in § 501(c)(4)
serves an analogous function to the "no-benefit" requirement of § 501(c)(3). Profit to
individuals is often said to violate both requirements. See Note, 50 VA. L. REv. 1243,
1245 & n.14 (1964). But it is always possible to find some "profit" just as it is always
possible to find some "benefit," Cases removing exemption from § 501(c)(4) organizations because of "profit" often may be best explained as based on the absence of any
"social welfare" activity justifying exemption. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Lake Forest,
Inc., 305 F.2d 814, 819 (4th Cir. 1962), reversing 36 T.C. 510 (1961) (corporation to
make housing available to public not exempt when "no State or local authority and
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tempt to allow tax-exempt organizations to operate businesses as long as
none of the profits were used for private objectives. 34 The "no-benefit"
requirement has been properly applied to remove exemptions from educational organizations which turned their net earnings over to officers
or other employees of the organization, 35 from allegedly charitable organizations whose sole activity was supporting the founder's employees, 36
and from foundations which loaned funds to businesses in which their
founder was interested.3 7 But the requirement has been used primarily
no civic or community entity has proclaimed . . . need for, adopted or subsidized the
activity sought to be exempted"); Scofield v. Rio Farms, 205 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1953),
affirming 103 F. Supp. 515 (W.D. Tex. 1952) (cooperative farm to assist low income
farmers supported by Texas law and Federal Farm Security Administration held
exempt); Consumer-Farmer Milk Co-op. v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1950),
affirming 13 T.C. 150 (1949) (organization not exempt which eliminated middleman in
milk business); United States v. Pickwick Elec. Membership Corp., 158 F.2d 272 (6th
Cir. 1946) (ruril electric cooperative supported by Tennessee law exempt); Garden
Homes v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1933) (construction of low cost housing
for workers supported by Wisconsin law and the City of Milwaukee held exempt);
Oregon Physicians' Serv. v. Horn, 220 Ore. 487, 349 P.2d 831 (1960) (contract medical
care organization not exempt under Oregon law identical to § 501(c)(4)). Contra,
Industrial Addition Ass'n v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1945), affirming 1
T.C. 378 (1942); Amalgamated Housing Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 817 (1938),
aff'd mere., 108 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1940).
34 See note 9 supra.
35 Birmingham Business College, Inc. v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1960);
Texas Trade School v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1959), affirming, 30 T.C.
642 (1958); Mabee Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 203 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1953);
Gemological Institute of America v. Riddell, 149 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. Cal. 1957); Lorain
Avenue Clinic, 31 T.C. 141 (1958).
36 Horace Heidt Foundation v. United States, 145 Ct. CI. 322, 170 F. Supp. 634
(1959).
37 Stevens Bros. Foundation, Inc., 39 T.C. 93 (1962) (dictum); Best Lock Corp., 31
T.C. 1217 (1959); cf. Donald G. Griswold, 39 T.C. 620 (1962) (permissible loans).
Although the question is not discussed, the cases suggest that exemption could be
removed for making loans which violate the "no-benefit" requirement, although they
do not constitute prohibited transactions under § 503(c). The "no-benefit" requirement
has also twice been used to remove the exemptions of organizations engaging in debtfinanced purchases of businesses. In one case, Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37 (1956),
afJ'd, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958), exemption was removed because the sale was a
"sham" and the exempt organization was used only as a perpetual conduit to pass
untaxed business income back to the so-called sellers of the business. Such activity
was within the proper meaning of impermissible benefit; money paid to the exempt
organization was used for private purposes. In Leon A. Beeghly Fund, 35 T.C. 490
(1960), exemption was also removed on the "no-benefit" reasoning when stockholders of
the vendor company were said to benefit from the opportunity quickly to liquidate
their investment in the company at capital gains rates. Id. at 520. But such benefit
does not distinguish the case from those which have allowed exemption. See Commissioner v. Johnson, 267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959); A. Shiffman, 82 T.C. 1073 (1959);
Ohio Furnace Co., 25 T.C. 179, 193-95 (1955) (dissenting opinion). The Beeghly court's
emphasis on the risk to the exempt vendee of not benefiting from the purchase better
explains the result. See 85 T.C. at 520. But no reason is apparent, or was given by the
Tax Court, for removing exemption from organizations which take risks. There was
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to remove the exemption of membership organizations such as business
leagues and social clubs and again can best be understood as preventing
operation of competitive businesses. The "no-benefit" reasoning is easily
applied to such organizations because people usually join with the expectation of some personal benefit.38 When a business is operatecd by a
membership organization, members inevitably benefit through reduced
dues or services provided to them at low cost. Although loss of exemption
has been explained by such benefits, 3 9 the cases cannot be squared with
40
other cases tolerating indistinguishable benefits.
When business leagues have engaged in businesses 41 which are usually
carried on by profit-making organizations and the businesses are more
than "incidental," exemption has been removed. General Contractors'
Ass'n v. United States42 is typical. A contractors' association engaged in
activities promoting the welfare of the construction industry, including
0

no suggestion that the organization violated the statutory prohibition against
investing income in a manner jeopardizing the carrying out of exempt purposes. INr.
RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 504(a)(3). Beeghly is inconsistent with the other cases cited above,
and cannot be justified. For the Commissioner's present approach to debt-financed sale
and lease-backs see Young, Donor Foundation Dealings, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FED. TAX
965, 996-1002 (Sellin ed. 1964).
88 See National Leather & Shoe Finders Ass'n, 9 T.C. 121, 126 (1947); Note, The
Taxation of Business Leagues, 40 VA. L. Rav. 467, 478 (1954).
89 West Side Tennis Club v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1940), affirming
39 B.T.A. 149 (1939), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 674 (1940) (benefit from reduction in dues);
Northwest Jobbers' Credit Bureau v. Commissioner, 37 F.2d 880 (8th Cir. 1930) (benefit
from service provided at cost) (alternative holding); Uniform Printing & Supply Co. v.
Commissioner, 33 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1929) (earnings reinvested, benefit from increased
value of enterprise); Spokane Motorcycle Club v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 151
(E.D. Wash. 1963) (goods and services provided to members from business profits);
Durham Merchant's Ass'n v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 71 (M.D.N.C. 1940) (benefit
from services provided at cost); National Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
291 (1943) (benefit from reduction in dues). See Note, supra note 38, at 474-79.
40 Commissioner v. Chicago Graphic Arts Fed'n, 128 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1942)
(services which members receive at cost); Fort Worth Club v. United States, 218 F. Supp.
431 (N.D. Tex. 1963) (rental income made increase in dues unnecessary); Huron Clinic
v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 847 (D.S.D. 1962) (lease income equal to percentage of
clinic's profits); Milwaukee Ass'n of Commerce v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 310
(E.D. Wis. 1947) (services provided at cost); American Refactories Institute, 6 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1947) (reduction in dues); Town and Country Club, 1 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 334 (1942) (reduction in dues); King County Ins. Ass'n, 37 B.T.A. 288
(19385 (reduction in dues). See Note, supra note 38.
41 Business leagues originally were not allowed to engage in any business activity.
See Underwriters' Lab. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 371, 374 (7th Cir. 1943). But the
courts have based their analysis on the proposition that business activity only "incidental" to other purposes will be allowed. See notes 39-40 supra. Also, the fact that
Congress placed a tax on the unrelated business income of business leagues, § 511(a)(2),
supports the proposition that business leagues are allowed to engage in some business
activity.
42 202 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1953).
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the conduct of safety schools, negotiation of collective bargaining agreements and labor disputes, promotion of apprenticeship programs, and
preparation of building codes and bidding procedures. For a fee it also
conducted engineering surveys of construction jobs being considered by
members. The surveying service was "identical in scope and purpose
with one prepared by a private survey organization. '43 Exemption was
removed allegedly because the surveys constituted benefit to members.
In rejecting the contention that the surveys were only incidental activity,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that they accounted
for approximately forty per cent of the organization's expenses. 44 But
exemption has been sustained in other cases in which equal or greater
percentages of income or expense resulted from profit-making activity.
Thus, a printers' association which received over forty per cent of its
income from business, and a trade association which received practically
all of its income from the operation of trade shows have been held
45
exempt.
It has been suggested that exemption will only be lost if benefits are
provided for individual members of the organizations, as in General
Contractors' Ass'n, rather than to members as a group. The Court of
Claims recently took this position in Evanston-North Shore Bd. of
Realtors v. United States,46 in denying exemption to a real estate board
which provided a listing service for brokers buying or selling property.
The court concluded that "when each member contributes in proportion
to what he receives [in listing services], it is a strong indication that
the benefits are not . . . 'inherently group benefits' . . .,,47 warranting
exemption. But the conclusion that services are sold to individual members amounts to no more than recognition that the organization is engaging in the business of selling the services. Since the profits from the
listing service varied from twenty-seven to forty per cent of the organization's total income, Evanston-North Shore Bd. of Realtors cannot
be squared with cases allowing business income to be forty per cent or
48
more of the organization's total receipts.
Characterization of the profit-making as non-competitive in cases sustaining exemption may distinguish the results. In American Institute of
43

Id. at 636.

Id. at 63S8.
Commissioner v. Chicago Graphic Arts Fed'n, 128 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1942);
American Institute of Interior Designers v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 201 (N.D.
Cal. 1962). See Evanston-North Shore Bd. of Realtors v. United States, 320 F.2d 375
(Ct. Cl. 1963).
46 320 F.2d 375 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
47 Id. at 379.
48 See cases cited note 45 supra.
44
45
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Interior Designers v. United States, 49 for example, operation of a trade
show by a business league was held by a district court to result in only
"incidental" benefit to members-and the exemption was sustainedalthough the shows accounted for practically all of the organization's
income and seventy per cent of its disbursements. Conduct of trade
shows was not referred to as a business or as competitive. 50 On the other
hand, the Tax Court removed exemption in American Auto. Ass'n,5 1
when the publishing, travel and insurance businesses carried on by the
52
organization were characterized as "competitive commercial activity."
Although not all the cases can be explained by this rationale, courts
have generally removed exemption from business leagues engaging in
competitive businesses which were more than "incidental."
Preventing exempt organizations from operating untaxed businesses
also best explains "no-benefit" cases which have removed exemption from
social dubs for operating public sports events, but not for selling or
renting land. In West Side Tennis Club v. Commissioner,53 exemption
was removed from a club which operated a public tennis tournament in
54
addition to its non-profit club activities. In Jockey Club v. Helvering,
the same result was reached when a club operated a public race track.
Members were said to benefit from each profit-making activity. In both
cases the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit emphasized that
exemption would not have been removed if income had not been
derived from the public. 55 By contrast, in Scofield v. Corpus Christi
Golf & Country Club,56 the club received oil lease income from its property. Benefit to the members was held not to require removal of exemp49

208 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1962).

50 No tax case has been found treating a trade show as a business. Two revenue

rulings on the subject indicate only that operation of trade shows does not constitute
exempt activity when sales of goods occur at the shows. Rev. Rul. 58-224, 1958-1 Cum.
BULL. 242; Rev. Rul. 57-25, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 196. Sales were not allowed at the trade
shows involved in American Institute of Interior Designers, supra note 49. Cf. Texas
Mobile Home Ass'n v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1963).

51 19 T.C. 1146 (1953).
52 Id. at 1160. Accord, Northwest Jobbers' Credit Bureau v. Commissioner, 37 F.2d
880 (8th Cir. 1930) (not exempt, engaging in business of sort normally carried on for
profit); Durham Merchant's Ass'n v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 71 (M.D.N.C. 1940)
(not exempt, providing services members would otherwise have to buy); Crooks v.
Kansas City Hay Dealers' Ass'n, 37 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1929) (exempt, not in competition
with any business); National Leather & Shoe Finders Ass'n, 9 T.C. 121 (1947) (exempt,
"not competitive in any ordinary sense').
53 111 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1940), affirming 39 B.T.A. 149 (1939), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 674
(1940).
54 76 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1935), affirming 30 B.T.A. 670 (1934).
55 76 F.2d at 598; 111 F.2d at 8.
56 127 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1942).
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tion and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit distinguished West
Side Tennis Club and Jockey Club on the grounds that oil lease income
was not derived from dealing with the public. Likewise, exemption has
58
57
been sustained when clubs sold land or rented part of their property.
II.

This comment has argued that many courts using the operated "exclusively" and "no-benefit" requirements to remove exemption are
responding to the same evil at which the unrelated business income tax
provisions are aimed-operation of an untaxed business. It is worth
noting, however, that untaxed businesses may not have the undesirable
effects assumed by Congress and the courts. Congress was told that the
competitive advantage lay in their ability to cut prices and accumulate
surpluses for expansion. 59 Yet under competitive conditions all firms in
an industry produce until the cost of another unit of output equals the
additional revenue it will bring. 60 Because an income tax is levied only
on profits, it will not be relevant in determining when that equalization
point is reached. Consequently, except when economic "costs" are not
deductible as business "expenses"-as when they do not meet the statutory requirement that they be "ordinary and necessary" 6 -- an income
57 Koon Kreek Klub v. Thomas, 108 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1939); Santee Club v. White,
87 F.2d 5 (Ist Cir. 1936).
58 Town and Country Club, I CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 334 (1940). Cf. Jack Little Foundation v. Jones, 102 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Okla. 1951). Such selling or leasing would go
untaxed even under the unrelated business income tax provisions. See § 512(b).
59 Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision
of 1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 590 (1950) [hereinafter cited 1950 Hearings] (statement for
American Hotel Association). Congressman Dingell stated in referring to a macaroni
company owned by New York University: "From the purely competitive standpoint
.... the advantage of a tax-exempt corporation ... is so great that, if something is not
done to level it off, the macaroni monopoly will be in the hands of the universities ....
Eventually all the noodles in this country will be produced by corporations held or
created by universities . .. and there will be no revenue to the Federal Treasury from
this industry." 1950 Hearings 579-80. The assumption of competitive advantage to
exempt organizations was disputed only once. See Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Proposed Revision of the Internal Revenue Code, 80th
Cong., Ist Sess. 3527 (1948) (statement for New York University). Even the representatives of exempt organizations accepted the competitive advantage assumption. See
1950 Hearings 495 (statement by the Treasurer of Harvard University), 503 (statement
by the President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for the Association of
American Universities).
60 See, e.g., DuE, GOVERNMENT FINANCE, AN ECONOIC ANALYSIS 223 (1959);
KRZYZANIAK & MUScRAvE, THE SHIFTING OF THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 2 (1963).
61 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162. Cost of production for a taxpaying firm will include the tax on the amount of the deduction which is not allowed. Since this "tax cost"
is not borne by an untaxed firm its economic costs will be less than those of its taxed
competitor, its equalization point will differ, and if the firm is a large part of
the industry price will drop.
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62
tax will not affect the price charged or the volume of production.
Again, the ability to accumulate funds faster would give the exempt organization no advantage because if there is opportunity for profitable
expansion taxed businesses will be able to obtain funds in money
and capital markets. 63
Although Congress' solution rests on doubtful economic assumptions,
it can be justified as preventing tax base shrinkage, and unlike the
courts' solution, it avoids needlessly handicapping exempt activities. Consequently, whenever an organization engages in some activity warranting
exemption, whether it is a charity or a business league, it should be
taxed only on its unrelated business income.
It may be objected that in reporting the unrelated business income
tax provisions the Senate Committee on Finance stated they were not
meant to change existing rules for determining exempt status. 64 But as
the court recognized in People's Educ. Camp Soc'y, the provisions would
be largely surplus if they could not be applied to the very problem for
which they were intended.65
Further, Congress should make the provisions applicable to organizations not now covered which may engage in business. 66 The provisions

62 Economists regard the businessman's return on his investment as a "cost"; the
tax collector calls it "profit." But the fact that this cost is taxed will not make the
taxed firm's price-output combination differ from that of its untaxed competitors. For
both kinds of firms, the return demanded will equal that available from alternative
investments and is thus an "opportunity cost." Since an untaxed firm can presumably
get an equal untaxed return from some alternative investment, its opportunity cost will
exceed that of the taxed firm's by exactly the amount the latter is taxed and there will
be no difference in the total costs of the taxed and untaxed firms.
63 Funds will not be available any more cheaply to the businesses of an exempt
organization, for even if the organization is able to accumulate funds without loss of
exemption, see note 3 supra, the organization foregoes profitable uses of the money
being accumulated. This "opportunity cost" must be recognized in comparing the cost
paid for money and capital by the business of an exempt organization with the price
paid in the money and capital markets by taxed businesses.
64 S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1950), 1950-2 CuM. BuLL 483, 505.
65 331 F.2d at 935.
66 The Treasury has gone to the opposite extreme, suggesting to Congress that
private foundations be forbidden to own more than a twenty per cent interest in any
business. Treasury Department, TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS (Comm. Print, Senate Committee on Finance 1965) 36-37 [hereinafter cited as
TREAsuRY REPOaR].

The Treasury has five objections to foundation-operated businesses:

(1) The Treasury suggests that serious competitive advantage results from the ability
of foundations to pay more than taxpaying purchasers for businesses purchased through
sale and lease backs, see note 3 supra, and from the foundations' ability to capitalize
and subsidize their businesses more easily than taxed enterprises. TREASURY REPORT
31-34. The ability to pay more raises the same problem presented to Congress in 1950
and resolved by taxing income received from certain kinds of property purchased with
borrowed funds. See note 3 supra. As the Treasury indicates, a problem results from
the fact that the tax is not presently applied to all income from debt-financed
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were not applicable to such groups, according to a Treasury spokesman,
because the ability of those organizations to engage in business is already limited by the Code. 67 But that is not true of "social welfare"
organizations and "social clubs." Commentators have divided over
whether, until Congress acts, those organizations should lose their exemption for engaging in business or whether the "destination" test should
property. TREASURY REPoRT 31-32. Insofar as the problem results from the limited
scope of the tax, it can be eliminated by taxing all income from debt-financed property,
thus removing the advantage resulting from the ability of exempt organizations to
pay the purchase price more rapidly out of business profits undiminished by taxation.
But it is doubtful that foundations will pay more than taxpaying purchasers for
businesses which they purchase with their own funds, for all purchasers want to
maximize the return on invested funds. The second sort of competitive advantage
found offensive by the Treasury is said to result from the ability of foundations to
accumulate funds to capitalize or subsidize their businesses. Id. at 82-84. But see text
accompanying note 63 supra. Any funds merely retained by the foundation for indefinite purposes may be forced into use by provisions suggested by the Treasury,
TRr.AsuY REPORT 26-30, or, in case the funds are retained in the business, by making
applicable the § 531 surtax on amounts accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of
the business. The Treasury suggests that such a solution would require an "arduous,
case-by-case examination" by the Revenue Service. TREAsURY RPORT 34 n.21. But such
examinations are carried out presently under § 581, and would have to be carried out
under the Treasury's proposed solution. Congress may decide that the price of policing
foundations' businesses is not worth the benefit which accrues to society from the
charitable activity made possible by business income. But it should at least weigh the
values involved before limiting all business activities of foundations.
(2) The Treasury's second argument is that "foundations are able to lease business
assets owned free of debt to operating subsidiaries, [and] siphon off most or all of the
business profits by means of rent which is deductible by the subsidiary but not taxable
to the parent foundation . . ." TRE-AsuRY REPORT 81. But when subsidiaries pay unreasonable rents, the excess has not been allowed as a business expense of the company.
E.g., Royal Farms Dairy Co., 40 T.C. 172, 187-91 (1968). Although the question has not
been litigated, the excess paid the foundation in such situations should not be treated
as rent, but rather as a disguised distribution of business profits taxable as unrelated
business income. Or, it may be argued that the foundation is a partner or joint venturer
with the business subsidiary, and therefore subject to the unrelated business income
tax. See Woodward v. Campbell, 285 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1950) (exempt American Legion
post joint venturer with bookie); Lanning, Tax Erosion and the "Bootstrap Sale" of a
Business, 108 U. PA. L. Rv. 623, 688 (1960). Since the evil which the Treasury identifies
can be prevented under present law, unless the burden of enforcing the law is too
heavy, the Treasury's solution is more drastic than the problem warrants.
(8) The Treasury's third criticism, that funds which should go to charity are denied
because invested in losing businesses, seems invalid. The trustees of charities, should
they make a mistake, will not long invest their money where it is not earning profits.
(4-5) The remaining criticisms are that operation of businesses results in self-dealing
and that the officers lack time to administer funds for charity. These may be the
Treasury's best arguments, but they are also its least well substantiated. Unless the
evil alleged is substantial, it is hardly enough to justify the limitations proposed.
67 1950 Hearings 170. Exempt employee beneficiary associations, § 501(c)(9), and
benevolent life insurance associations, § 501(c)(12), are required to raise 85 per cent of
their income from members. Other limitations apply to the income producing activities
of teachers retirement funds, § 501(c)(11), and cemetery companies, § 501(c)(18).
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be applied. 68 The only decision on the question relied on Congress'
policy of competitive equality and concluded that exemption must be
removed. 69 Again, although the competitive advantage to such organizadons is doubtful, making the provisions applicable would prevent tax
base shrinkage without loss of exemption.
In definining taxable income for purposes of the provisions, "business"
should be given the same meaning as in other sections of the Revenue
Code, 70 such as those allowing deduction of business expenses. 71 The
meaning of "unrelated" requires analysis of the organization's need to
engage in the business as part of its exempt activity.72 Thus, for example,
a college radio station may be considered "related."7 3 The exclusion of
so-called "passive" investment income-rents, royalties, dividends and
capital gains-from unrelated business income 74 has caused a definitional
problem similar to one which arises elsewhere in the Code, and courts
have properly used the precedents developed elsewhere to resolve it.
For example, the Tax Court has applied the tests developed to distinguish "business" from "investment" for capital gains purposes to
determine whether receipts from an exempt organization's sale of real
estate were taxable as business income. 75
It may be objected that the reasoning of this comment encourages
exempt organizations to engage in business. But if taxed on the profits,
68 Suggesting no loss of exemption are: Note, Federal Income and New York Real
Property Charitable Tax Exemptions: Application of the "Exclusive" Test, 35 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 96, 106 n.52 (1960); Moore & Dohan, Sales, Churches, and Monkeyshines,
11 TAX L. REv. 87, 111 (1956); Note, 50 VA. L. REv. 1243, 1249 (1964). Such a result
would be inconsistent with the policy of preventing competitive advantage, but would
accord with a policy of special subsidy for certain organizations. Note, 48 MINN. L. REV.
1149, 1166 n.66 (1964), argues that the organizations not covered are to be allowed no
substantial business activity.
69 People's Educ. Camp Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1964),
affirming 39 T.C. 552 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 839 (1964).
70 The unrelated business income tax provisions were meant to adopt the meaning
of business developed elsewhere in the Code. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
109 (1950), 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 380, 409; S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1950),
1950-2 Cum. BuLL. 483, 559.
71 INT. Rv. CoDE oF 1954, § 162.
72 It is not at all clear why a competitive "unrelated" business should be taxed and a
similar "related" business not. Each in its own way furthers the exempt purpose and
each has the same effects on competitors, whatever that may be. See notes 59-63 supra
and accompanying text.
73 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a)(4) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6525, 1961-1 Cum. BULL. 186.
See Comment, Colleges, Charities,and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 YALE L.J. 851, 85657 (1951); Note, 34 NoTa DAME LAw. 238, 247-48 (1959).
74 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b)(l)-(5).
75 See The Marian Foundation, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 99 (1960). See also Cooper
Tire & Rubber Co., 36 T.C. 96 (1961), aff'd, 306 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1962); Robert A. Welch
Foundation v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
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there is no apparent reason why they should not be allowed to do so.
Even under the case law businesses may be operated if "incidental."
Since "incidental" is a relative term and has been interpreted to require
comparison with the exempt activities, businesses which earn substantial
profits have sometimes been allowed if the profits were not more than
an "incidental" amount of the organization's income. For example, an
organization was allowed to engage in a business producing $20,000
when its other income was $350,000,76 but another's exemption was lost
when its business produced $15,000 while its other income was only
$37,000.77 Use of the unrelated business income tax would simplify the
law by eliminating the "incidental" test and would deal in each case
with the factor at which the courts have been covertly aiming-unfair
competition by untaxed business.
76 Milwaukee Ass'n of Commerce v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 210 (E.D. Wis. 1947).
77 Evanston-North Shore Bd. of Realtors v. United States, 320 F.2d 375, 881 n.4 (Ct.
Cl. 1963).

